Confidential Recorded Interview Transcript

Interview Date: 01/29/25
IPR Case #: 2023-B-0069
IPR File Name: 2023-B-0069 Cmdr. Dobson involved.m4a
Complainant:

Investigator: Casey Clithero, Eric Berry
Interviewed: Commander Craig Dobson

CLITHERO: Okay, we're good.
BERRY: All right.
KOPPANG: All right, my name's Internal Affairs Sergeant ERIC KOPPANG. The date is January 29, 2025. The time is approximately 10:05 a.m., and we're located within the Internal Affairs Large Conference Room. The persons present are Assistant Chief CRAIG DOBSON, DPSST Number 35609, Attorney NICOLE ROBBINS, IPR Investigators CASEY CLITHERO and ERIC BERRY, and Assistant Deputy City Attorney HEIDI BROWN. We're here in regards to IPR Case Numbers 2023-B-0069, 2023-B-0070, 2022-B-0024, and 2022-B-0025, and there are multiple corresponding Case Numbers. Assistant Chief DOBSON has been advised that his conduct and/or the conduct of any other Bureau Member present during various 2020 Portland civil unrest events is the subject of this investigation. Assistant Chief DOBSON has reviewed information necessary to be reasonably apprised of the nature of the allegations of the complaints. Assistant Chief DOBSON has been informed that he is an Involved Member in Case 23-B-0069, and a Witness Member in the other Case Numbers I listed off before, and that IPR Director ROSS CALDWELL is in charge of the investigations. I've advised Assistant Chief DOBSON that he could have an attorney or advocate present during the interview, and Attorney NICOLE ROBBINS is here in that capacity. Assistant Chief DOBSON, under the authority of Chief BOB DAY, I'm ordering you to answer all questions fully and truthfully. If you fail to respond fully and truthfully, you may be disciplined up to and including dismissal. Do you understand, sir?
DOBSON: Yes.
KOPPANG: I'll now turn this interview over to the IPR investigators.
CLITHERO: Okay, thank you. Okay, so, Chief DOBSON, thank you for makin' the time this morning. So just to give a little bit of context when we're looking at all of 2020, we identified certain dates based on - we identified nights that included a crowd dispersal based on logs that we reviewed, requested a lot of FED video, and watched a lot of - really almost all the FED video associated with dispersals to try to identify certain nights. We kind of isolated videos that were a little bit visually problematic from a perspective of Directive 1010. And so what we'll be goin' through is kind of those nights. I have some videos to take a look at. If you have any questions about context or anything as we review video, just feel free to ask.
DOBSON: Sure.
CLITHERO: As far as the thumb drives, I gave you full materials, did you have a chance to look over those and look at -
DOBSON: I did review some of the materials, not all of 'em.
CLITHERO: Okay. Appreciate that. Some of the questions we'll be asking will be a little bit rudimentary. We write

for a variety of audiences, and so some of them will seem very basic about terms, nomenclature, use of force practices, that kind of stuff. So just to start, how long have you been with the Bureau?
DOBSON: I was hired in July of 1998.
CLITHERO: Okay. And what have been your various assignments and responsibilities during your time?
DOBSON: I've been an officer, a sergeant, a lieutenant, captain, commander, and now assistant chief. I've been assigned to the three different precincts through my rotation and training, through my probationary period. In 2001 I was a member of the Rapid Response Team as an officer. In 2010 I was promoted to sergeant, remained on the RRT Team then. Was also, after seven months of probation put over to the Special Event Sergeant at Central Precinct, where I was in charge of planning for events, as well as reviewing all of the special events that occur in the downtown area. In 2016 was placed as a lieutenant. As a lieutenant, I was put in the Office of the Inspector General, which now the Inspector General, I was the Inspector for all Force and worked with the use of force, as well as any kind of auditing that we did for those type of things. I was there until approximately 2018, no 2019. I became a captain assigned to the East Precinct, was there for almost a year, and then assigned to Training as the captain. Was there for approximately seven months, and then while 2020 was going on, and I was overseeing the protests, I was promoted to captain, or I'm sorry, commander, and assigned Central Precinct, but actually didn't get to Central Precinct until roughly 2021, January of 2021. And then was promoted this month a couple weeks ago to assistant chief.
CLITHERO: Congratulations.
DOBSON: Thanks.
CLITHERO: So in terms of ICS, Incident Command System, what training have you received on that?
DOBSON: So I've taken all of the basic courses that are required for officers, which is 100, 200, 700, 900, as well as 300 and 400. In addition to that, I've taken specific positions for Planning Section Chief, Operations Section Chief. Gone to EMI, which is Emergency Management Institute back east, where I became an instructor of ICS as well. So those are the - and I've taken a whole bunch of online courses, as well as sports-related courses that are ICS-related for incident type stuff.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you.
DOBSON: As well as attended TEEX for the 400-something level course.
CLITHERO: Okay, thank you. So within ICS, what's your understanding of the duties of the Crowd Management Incident Commander, CMIC?
DOBSON: So CMIC is a unique name that we give an incident commander for within here at Portland. In ICS that doesn't exist, that position. It's simply called an Incident Commander. And so we believed that because of the complexity of events, that public order events - that we wanted special training in that, and so we created roughly about 2018 or '19, we built a class for that that covered that. So specifically, a Crowd Management Incident Commander is somebody who's had specific training so that they can understand how public order works, and then be able to be an incident commander within that.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Same question, what's your understanding of the duties of the Operation Section Chief?
DOBSON: So within ICS, the incident commander is the overall incident - they're the one that sets the objectives and is overall in control. The Operation Section Chief, their role is specifically to take the objectives that the incident commander develops, and then build out the resources required to meet those objectives, as well as look at optional missions, and that type of thing, and then assign 'em. Now operationally, what that looks like is after they have their resources set, they will then push out missions depending on what the situation is. It's a little different than, you know, in traditional ICS, ICS was built largely for fire management and firefighting, particularly wildland firefighting where you've got something, and then you set the day, you set the tone, you give the missions, and it runs for its operational period, unless weather changes, or something else. In public order, sometimes where you see changes is because of the dynamics of it and the evolution of what's going on, sometimes you have to change those missions, and even objectives the night of or during the event to meet those changes.

CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. I'm gonna read a little bit from 635-10, regarding the role of the CMIC to set up the next question. "CMIC, this position possesses the overall responsibility for managing the demonstration by establishing objectives, planning strategies, implementing tactics in accordance with this directive and Directive 700 and IMS and ICS." With that in mind, can you describe for us the difference between objectives, strategies, and tactics?
DOBSON: Sure. are your overall kind of big picture, almost, not quite policy, but they're the big picture, this is kind of broadly what we hope to happen for the day. They can be very specific. They're supposed to be smart, so they're supposed to be measurable, specific time, objective, reasonable, and there's another letter in there that I'm not remembering.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: But you set objectives based on kind of the totality of what you understand is going on. Then strategies, or missions, is how do you carry out those objectives. How do you meet those objectives? What tasks are you going to assign to do that? Tactics are on the ground, how do you carry out, again those missions.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: It's the boots on the ground decision of how you carry those things out.
CLITHERO: Okay. So would it be accurate to say the CMIC is responsible for identifying incident objectives and strategies, and the office chief is responsible for determining appropriate tactics?
ROBBINS: Can you say that again?
CLITHERO: Sure. Is it accurate to say the CMIC is responsible for identifying incident objectives and strategies, and the office chief is responsible for determining appropriate tactics? And that question comes from an amalgamation of -
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: - interviews we've conducted.
DOBSON: I would say sort of.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: So Incident Commander is gonna set the objectives, is gonna be part of thinking about what those strategies are, and working with the Operation Section Chief to develop those strategies of those missions that you want to assign. But the Operation Section Chief should never be into the tactics of how you're moving people across the board, for the most part. There's gonna be times when they do say, hey, you know, from our view, we need to move resources here or there. But largely, that's gonna be pushed down. The tactical level is done on the ground by the lieutenant that's on the ground.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you, appreciate that. You touched on this in the first question, but what training did you receive or experience did you have regarding RRT prior to the protects? Rapid Response Team.
DOBSON: So I started in 2001, was an officer. In 2001 until 2010, right before I became a sergeant, I was trained as a grenadier for a very short period of time, and then I went in to being a sergeant there. Somewhere in that period of time I was also an instructor, one of the lead instructors for them within RRT. But I was also - later on became the instructor for kind of the broader CMIC program as well.
CLITHERO: Okay. So within that, would you say you had a pretty good understanding of the capabilities of RRT and resources they had, and what their general purpose was?
DOBSON: Yes.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Yes.
CLITHERO: In your role as CMIC, where were you typically assigned or positioned physically during the protests?
DOBSON: So in the very beginning, in the first couple of days of May, we were in this building, 1111 Southwest Second on the 15th floor. On the first night when they set it on fire, we then decided that maybe this wasn't the best place to be, and so we transitioned out to the Training Division out there at 158th-ish and Airport Way, and for the rest of the time were out there.
CLITHERO: Okay. From that position, I know this may have evolved over the course of the summer and fall, but

did you have eyes on what was happening with the flashpoints and general protest activity?
DOBSON: So early on, we had the capability of using livestream. Let me step back. There's a couple of things that we had at times. So from our internally, we would have the ability for the plane. If the weather was permitting we would be able to use the plane to get kind of a broad view of what was happening from 5000 feet basically, or 3000 feet, whatever they operated at. Early on it kind of evolved in that we had live-streamers out on the ground who were part of the demonstrations that we were able - because they were publicly available and they were broadcasting, we were tapping into those. As time went on through this event, there were individuals within the protest that recognized that that might be intelligence for us, or that we might be using that, and so they began to use influence and pressure those folks to then change how they were broadcasting. And so as it changed, as it went along, as we got into I would say July, and I don't have exact times, but roughly about July, they had curtailed a lot of their livestreaming. And eventually as we get into August, they would only turn livestream on when police came out to deal with an issue that we were being directed at. And so, our ability to see, if you will, what was going on, and have situational awareness at that level, or from that frame, was only through that, and it started to get curtailed. We still had people on the ground who would be able to articulate and paint the picture of what's happening so that we have a good idea of what that looks like. And I would say, I wanna say early on, like in the first days, the livestreaming hadn't really kicked off. It was kind of in that mid June-ish that it really started to go, and you had lots of people - you know, it was a money-maker for several people. So you were startin' to see more and more of those individuals show up, because the more likes they got, if they hit a certain point, they would get financially recouped for that type of thing. And so there was different levels of situational awareness that we were working through. That's a long answer for a short question.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate it. Okay. So during a protest, did you in your role as CMIC ever have interaction with line officers or other non-command staff? Let's say a sergeant and below. Did you have contact with those people who were on the ground?
DOBSON: Define contact.
CLITHERO: Phone, radio?
ROBBINS: Could you clarify when the contact?
DOBSON: Yeah**.**
ROBBINS: Are you talking about when you're operating -
CLITHERO: When you're operating -
ROBBINS: - out at Training Division during events?
CLITHERO: You know, when you're serving as CMIC during a protest event.
DOBSON: So, every day we would have a briefing, which supervisors and above, so sergeants and above would be involved in that briefing. It was done by Zoom due to COVID. And so they would be briefed that way, so that would be, I guess, contact.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: There were times that I would, prior to the shift, show up and meet with RRT or a different group of people just to touch base with them. And then afterwards, after the event, there would be times that I would check in on people. And then during the event, depending on where were at, I could have phone calls or messaging from specific sergeants, but typically it was from my field commander, which was a lieutenant that I would be communicating directly with.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Okay. In terms of tactics, and if I mislabel anything that I'm about to list, feel free to correct me. Tactics such as dynamics, deployment of less lethals, how did those decisions come to be made? Who authorizes those? Who makes the call on when those are used?
DOBSON: So depends on what it is. Yeah, that's a really broad question to be able to answer that. I'm not sure exactly what you're lookin' for on that.
CLITHERO: Okay. Say within a mission -
DOBSON: Sure.
CLITHERO: - they identify a tactic to use, and that tactic is a less lethal, or something you have at hand to move a

crowd. Is it somebody on the ground that makes that call, that you're gonna use a less lethal in a situation?
DOBSON: So typically what it looks like is based on crowd demeanor, how things are going, what the temperature is, what criminal activity we're seeing, what's the threat level that we're evaluating. The ground would typically ask us, hey, are we authorized to use X? Whether that be 40 millimeter FN, you know, less lethal. And we would authorize that depending on, again, the totality of what we're seeing and the information we're getting we would authorize whether they could use that tool. Now, the use of the tool is completely down to the ground. And so, if we gave a mission, "Hey, at this point we would like you to clear this area," that's up to the ground to decide how that's done and what that looks like and what they use, or how they accomplish that. That's again tactical.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: And I wouldn't get - the CMIC typically wouldn't be saying, "Hey, I want you to do X to do this."
CLITHERO: Okay. So there wouldn't be a situation of you be saying, you know, "Do a dynamic up Madison." Like that wouldn't be something that you would communicate an order?
DOBSON: Usually not, no.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: That would be rare, very rare.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Moving on to authorization of the use of the CS gas, can you give me a sense of what that process looks like prior to the TRO, after the TRO, and what it kinda looks like now, if it's different.
DOBSON: Which TRO?
CLITHERO: Sorry. The Don't Shoot Portland TRO.
DOBSON: So there were two of those.
CLITHERO: Right.
BERRY: First Hernandez, Second Hernandez, yeah.
DOBSON: So prior to that, the standard that we were using was we wanted it to be an unlawful assembly.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: But it had to be more than just simply sitting in the street. So unlawful assembly is not defined in ORS. We would use those terms, again almost synonymous with riot. So, we would get to a place where we would not use gas unless we believed it was the tool that would be able to fix or - it was a last-use tool. It wasn't something that we used lightly.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Recognizing the impact that gas has and the impact that we have, because it's a non-discriminative tool in that it's a gas. You can't control where it goes. It would be one of the tools, and the last tools that we had as an option. So if we couldn't accomplish it through another mission or another way of trying to do things, that was the tool that we would use prior to the Hernandez.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: After Hernandez, again, it didn't really change, 'cause it's basically life safety.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: You know, at that point the threshold is life safety. That's where we were at basically. In most cases where it's like we've used everything else. We've tried everything else, and this is our last tool option. And so Hernandez, when it came out, it didn't really change how we did it. It just changed how we articulated the why, so that we could meet and ensure that we were within Hernandez, you know, the decision by Hernandez. On the second level of Hernandez, that included not only tear gas, but it was all of our less lethals as well. Those also got limited. And so it had to be a life safety issue.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: If I remember right, the second Hernandez was by July, late July. I can't remember when it actually came out. But by then we were in a very defensive posture, and literally were allowing it to get to life safety before we would try to address it, because again, we're dealing with multiple layers here. And one of the layers that we're dealing with is this impression that we are the cause of the unrest. And so we have sucked in to a defensive position so that literally they're either shredding our fence and taking the plywood off of our building,

or trying to light something on fire that actually has a life safety issue before we would go out and address the issue, so that we were for sure well over the threshold of this is basically a riot, although oftentimes we wouldn't call it a riot because of the perception of, oh my goodness, it's another riot type thing, so we would use unlawful assembly. And then, you asked like that was after Hernandez, and then -

CLITHERO: How does it look now? What does it look like?

DOBSON: So now, ORS has adopted a lot of what Hernandez is. We're not allowed to use tear gas unless I've officially declared a riot, I've given warnings, I've got a basically life safety issue. It really hasn't changed how we have - changed how we operated it. I think the perception has changed. But really, it was our last option. And prior to that, when we're gonna use tear gas, we always gave warnings.

CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.

DOBSON: If it was feasible, there was always two warnings. Prior to that, it was you give 'em a route to go so that they - you know, you can't box 'em in and then tear gas 'em, like - what was it, Philadelphia on the freeway kinda thing. We had a series of processes that we went through. So if you want me to go into that, I can go into that, or we can go - I mean, how deep do you want me to get into that?

CLITHERO: I don't think we need to go too deep.

DOBSON: Okay.

CLITHERO: In the interest of time, I think we can -

DOBSON: Okay.

CLITHERO: Just a clarifying question, how do you define life safety, or alternatively, what are some examples of life safety concerns that typically showed?

DOBSON: Sure. So in our viewpoint, what we wanted to make sure, again, we're balancing this perception that the media, that the politicians, that the public is, that we're the problem. And so our threshold oftentimes was far higher than I think if the public was there they would've thought that was okay, that we would wait that long. Literally, it's I'm worried that an officer's gonna get injured, whether that's through a rock or a bottle, or enough stuff is being thrown at or directed at the police that I am concerned that someone's gonna get hurt, seriously hurt.

CLITHERO: Okay. Appreciate that. Last question around procedure stuff - we'll be watching some video.

DOBSON: Okay.

CLITHERO: Are you able to visually differentiate say on screen or video that you've seen or training video, the difference between gas and smoke visually?

DOBSON: No.

CLITHERO: Okay. Neither can we.

BERRY: Yeah, we haven't figured out a definitive -

DOBSON: There's -

ROBBINS: There's no way.

DOBSON: There is no way.

CLITHERO: Okay.

DOBSON: I mean, I've been on the ground and used both in training, and you can't tell.

BERRY: Some folks I've talked to have talked about CS having a yellowish cast to it, but I haven't found that that proves to be true watchin' a lot of that video. It all looks like smoke.

DOBSON: Smoke comes in like -

BERRY: A bunch of different colors.

DOBSON: - thirty-one different flavors and colors.

BERRY: Yeah.

DOBSON: And so, yeah.

BERRY: Yeah.

ROBBINS: And I think it depends on how the light reflects too, right?

BERRY: I was gonna say -

ROBBINS: Depending on if you have more of an orangish light, it's gonna reflect off the (inaudible - 00:24:38) -
BERRY: At night you can't tell anything.
ROBBINS: No.
BERRY: Yeah.
ROBBINS: Yeah.
CLITHERO: So we won't be going linearly through these, 'cause I think some of these have a more simple fact pattern to them and fewer questions associated with them. And we'll get into - I think it's 06/12 of '20 and 09/05 of '20 are gonna be the ones we have a few more questions about.
DOBSON: Okay.
ROBBINS: I mean, can you just identify by date which ones you're starting with?
BERRY: Yeah.
CLITHERO: 06/12 is the one we're gonna start with.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: In your review of materials, and just - I don't know, for me, 2020, like dates burn into my head 'cause I did a lot of investigations around those. Does that date, or anything you read bring anything significant to memory to you of that evening?
DOBSON: None particular at the moment.
CLITHERO: Okay. I'm gonna pull up the video, and this one, again we - so we looked over a lot of FED video. We found out with that was problematic. As we reviewed these, we didn't have the knowledge that we got from interviews and from other things to understand -
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: - kinda how things worked operationally. We've showed these to folks that were involved in those evenings, and that's where these questions are gonna be coming from. I wanna be careful as I fast-forward through videos that I'm not omitting any context. So if you have concern for that, fee free to speak up.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: I just have timestamps for when these occur.
ROBBINS: And this is all FED video?
CLITHERO: This is all FED video.
DOBSON: Yeah. The pole cam stuff from the criminalists.
CLITHERO: Yeah, so this one is a dynamic where there's a use of force against somebody who - the concern that was flagged was this was a person who appeared to be complying with directions to move.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: And be looking for a person on a bicycle over here on the left, or the right side.
(Video begins at 00:26:16 and ends at 00:26:36.)
ROBBINS: I was looking at the wrong bike.
DOBSON: Me too.
BROWN: Me too.
ROBBINS: I was lookin' at the white bike.
CLITHERO: Yeah, so that one -
ROBBINS: Yeah, I was lookin' at the light on the street instead of on the side. Sorry, can we go back?
CLITHERO: Yeah, I'll it again. Yeah.
ROBBINS: Unless CRAIG, you got what you needed?
DOBSON: I got what I needed.
CLITHERO: Okay, it's about 13 seconds. I'll just play it one more time.
(Video beings at 00:26:52 and ends at 00:27:08.)
ROBBINS: Can we stop? And then, can we just have two minutes real quick before you go into your questions about it?
CLITHERO: Sure. Do you wanna go off the record here?

ROBBINS: Yeah.
CLITHERO: Okay.
ROBBINS: Thanks. I think they're goin' of. We can leave the room.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: It is 10:39 and we are back on the record. Any questions, or anything I can clarify for you after the break? Okay. Just some questions about what you saw on the video, and then maybe what surrounded the video. Can you confirm for that what's on the video is what's known as a dynamic?
DOBSON: That would appear to be a dynamic, yes.
CLITHERO: Okay. Does it appear to be a dynamic that's working as designed?
DOBSON: Sure. I mean, I guess I've never considered what is it - so the objective of - originally when the dynamic was taught early on, the objective was you would, on the ground, want to move a crowd, get some distance and cause the crowd to cause distance. One of the challenges was, like if you were two sporting teams playing over and over and over again, you become accustomed to how they do their layup, or how they do the three-point, or who was leading. You know, how things work. And so tactics slowly evolve. And so traditionally, a dynamic would be, you know, a quick burst of 10 yards and then stop, and that would cause the crowd to push away. As you can imagine, as this evolves, that 10-yard quick, stop, well they know what's gonna happen, and so they don't move. And so it becomes maybe 20 yards. And so, one of the things I know on the ground that we were hearing and being told is that every time the crowd stopped, more projectiles would come. It would give them time to turn around and launch projectiles, and again, start the offensive. They would take back the initiative and start the offensive. And so in some cases, with certain groups or at certain times, that dynamic became longer and longer.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you.
ROBBINS: Can I ask a clarifying question about the video. Do you know what time this occurred? There's no timestamp.
CLITHERO: Not specifically. And that is one of our issues with FED video, is that there's no timestamps. We had to try and arrange these by officers' FDCRs. Now I believe that this dynamic is addressed, and Officer KELLY, who did the push. I believe it's addressed in his FDCR. Within FDCRs, some officers put the time that they're filling it out, and some put in the time of the force, some put nothing at all. So there's some limitations we have just as far as our ability to put these things together as well. That's a long answer to your question.
ROBBINS: Okay.
CLITHERO: The short answer is, no, we don't know precisely when it is.
ROBBINS: Okay.
CLITHERO: So, as someone familiar with force, does that use of force, or anything you saw on the video, would that cause you concern as somebody who reviews force, or has reviewed force?
DOBSON: I think we would want clarification on, again, you know, we got another TRO later on -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - that was about, and we had to address slow walkers, and what that looks like. So we would have to have a discussion about what was the cause, or what was your thought of, you know, as that person starts to slow down, or fall behind the rest of the herd or the rest of the pack.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: What was the thought process on why there was a push there.
CLITHERO: Okay, appreciate that. Thank you. Question that will go the allegation later toward the end, but did you order this dynamic specifically?
DOBSON: I would not have ordered dynamics.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Again, they might've asked -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - "Are we authorized to use dynamics," at some point, but most of the time, again, mission was given, "Hey, we need this area cleared," and then they would make those determinations on the ground based on the

situation.
CLITHERO: Okay. And I think you already stated, might've been a sergeant, might've a field commander makin' that call?
DOBSON: Typically it was your lieutenant, or working through a sergeant. Again, in situations such as this where you've got multiple groups going down multiple streets, you've got one field commander working in coordination with multiple different units, and so you would have sergeants ultimately making some of those decisions.
CLITHERO: Okay, appreciate that. Okay, so we're through that one. We're gonna move on now to 06/27 of '20. This video is another dynamic.
CLITHERO: Again, you know, no timestamp. We don't know specifically when this is.
ROBBINS: So is that September 27?
BERRY: June 27.
CLITHERO: June 27.
ROBBINS: June 27, sorry.
CLITHERO: Yeah.
DOBSON: They're still downtown.
BERRY: Yeah.
CLITHERO: And I wanna be fair about, you know, offering some context here. So the concern about this was a dynamic that was - appears to have been conducted pretty close to a crows that was static.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: So we're about 15 seconds out, here.
(Video begins at 00:33:08 and ends at 00:33:32.)
CLITHERO: So it's that. I mean, it's that use of force or - to my eye, there were two people that went down as a result of bein' overcome by the dynamic. Do you want me to play it back one more time? Okay.
ROBBINS: Did you say no or yes?
DOBSON: No. Sorry.
CLITHERO: Let me skip to the pertinent question. Did you order this dynamic? Or do you believe that you ordered this dynamic specifically?
DOBSON: No.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Again, I don't know what the situation is here exactly -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - of what caused them to do a dynamic.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Why we were doin' a dispersal. Again, the mission might've been, yes, disperse them, for whatever reason. And again, it has to reach a certain threshold. We're not just dispersing because you've got a crowd standing there.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: There's gotta be a reason why, you know.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Is that rocks and bottles? What's causing that to happen?
CLITHERO: Okay. I know it's a snippet. Did you witness any crowd behavior in the snippet that we witnessed that would precipitate running a dynamic right at that time, or anything you saw from the crowd that was of concern by this video?
DOBSON: I don't know what - again, you showed me midway. I don't know what led up to that, and I don't know again, from the 10,000 foot view, where we're at.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Even in this night kind of thing.
CLITHERO: I appreciate that. I wanna be fair in askin' these questions.

DOBSON: Yeah, no.
CLITHERO: As far as the way a dynamic is designed to work, is it optimal to run a dynamic from that close? Or I'm curious if that's - I mean, is proximity to the crowd, is that somethin' that is concerned usually?
DOBSON: So again, we have to weigh kind of the totality of 2020, and again, how I talked about this evolution of things. Why they did that, I can't tell you what the purpose of, what it was, or even what the mission was, where were at at that point in time. But the challenge was, is as we continued to have contact with them night after night after night, things were evolving, and so you could do maybe something effective on one night, and on the next night it's not effective anymore because they recognize that they know what you're gonna do.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: If that makes sense. And so, I can't necessarily explain we're evolving constantly the entire time, going through it.
CLITHERO: Okay. I think that's fair. I mean, I hear you say that they adjusted their tactics to meet your tactics is kind of is the -
DOBSON: Consistently.
CLITHERO: Thank you. There'll be some more questions kind of in that vein a little bit -
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: - later on. Okay, I just wanna be uniform in asking my questions. I'm gonna ask this one again. Would this one have come from a sergeant or a field commander? The direction to affect this dynamic?
DOBSON: That would've come from the ground.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Any questions, concerns? Any thoughts that you think are -
DOBSON: Not at the moment, no.
CLITHERO: Okay, appreciate that. Gonna move on to 09/26.
(Video begins at 00:36:52 and ends at 00:37:15.)
CLITHERO: I'm gonna get to where my timestamp is. Okay. So I'm gonna back this one up just to get as much context as we can. I do appreciate the complexity of showing you these snippets and asking questions, so.
DOBSON: Yeah.
(Video begins at 00:37:24 and ends at 00:38:33.)
CLITHERO: The issue's gonna come up at the top of the intersection here. Okay. So, to provide context, again, the concern that was flagged on that one was the person going to the ground and being shoved again to the ground. Again, I appreciate absent context, you might not know precisely why that occurred. Is there anything about that video that caused you concern as somebody who reviews force? And would you like me to replay it? Maybe I should've led with that?
DOBSON: I would need - I mean, yeah, I would wanna know what the context is of why. You know, what was done and why it was done.
CLITHERO: Okay. Most central question, did you order this dynamic?
DOBSON: No. I mean, if you listen to the video, you're hearing someone give that command from the ground.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: So I'm not giving that. I mean, looking at the video, there's a lot of stuff going on, so I don't know what the context of why -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - they decided to speed up, you know, that movement that they were doing. But there was, I mean, there were lights and sirens in all different directions from what I saw, so I don't know the context of why that direction was given.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. We're gonna move on to 09/28. I wanna pull up the ICS log on this one, just to be - and I highlighted it where there are issues. This has to do - so Sergeant DAMERVILLE was the squad leader on this evening of protests, and he reported using OC vapor.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: And this was an issue where an officer was bear-sprayed, and the order was given to clear I think the

7-Eleven parking lot. First does any of this draw like a memory for you at all? I know it was a long summer and fall.
DOBSON: Was I - I mean -
CLITHERO: Yeah, you were the CMIC.
DOBSON: A hundred nights of these. So I was the one for this night? Okay.
CLITHERO: Yeah, mm-hmm. Okay.
DOBSON: They all kind of - yeah, certain nights stick out, as you said.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: But other nights are, you know, unless I read the entire thing will I able to recall exactly what this is.
CLITHERO: Okay. So before we jump into the video, can you make kind of a distinction between OC vapor and fog, and CS gas, and kind of what those two things do and how they differ? And then - well, I'll ask a follow-up question -
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: - after that.
DOBSON: I'm just readin'.
CLITHERO: I got you.
DOBSON: So allow me to read this for just a second here to get my bearings.
CLITHERO: Let me know if you need me to scroll at all.
DOBSON: Yeah. Okay, so your question would be -
CLITHERO: Yeah, differentiating OC vapor and CS gas, kinda what they're designed to do and how they differ?
DOBSON: So they're both an irritant. OC vapor is in the same cannister. When it's deployed it's very localized. And so it puts out, through compressed air, it's like a psst. And you have a literally cloud of vapor of about eight feet roughly -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - on a good day.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: So it's super localized. As opposed to CS gas, which is typically used. It burns, and as it burns, it puts out a cloud of smoke that's very volume-heavy. Voluminous, is that the right word?
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm. Sure.
DOBSON: All right. Perfect. And so, OC vapor would be, you know, if we're at that level that we can use certain tools, and not wanting to infect an entire neighborhood, we would use that as a localized tool to affect a small knot of people, as opposed to, you know, possibly part of a neighborhood.
CLITHERO: Okay. As far as what goes into authorizing OC vapor, is that the same threshold as CS gas? So this is post second TRO. Is there a life safety condition attached to it, or is this something that you can use?
DOBSON: I'm tryin' to remember at this point, and I don't recall at this point if we had specifically named OC vapor as the same. You know, because they are different. One is similar to pepper spray, as opposed to, again, the volumes of smoke that tear gas is. And I'm uncertain at this junction, or when we made the distinction of yes, that is all considered tear gas, per se. So I don't know when that occurred, exactly.
CLITHERO: It just occurs to me to ask as I look at this. It says, "Ops 2, L2, with respect to conditions, OC vapor is good. RBDDs have to be life-threatening." Is that helpful?
DOBSON: Not particularly, no.
CLITHERO: Okay. Okay.
DOBSON: Again, because perception from the judge of which tool is which. You know, what each tool does. Does it get lumped in completely? Again, because each tool is unique, and this one acts more like pepper spray, that I don't know at this point in time.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you.
DOBSON: When we shut all things down.
CLITHERO: That's helpful to know.

DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: I'm gonna jump into the video now.
(Video begins at 00:45:00 and ends at 00:45:44.)
ROBBINS: Same night?
CLITHERO: Same night. Okay. Did you catch the deployment there?
DOBSON: I did.
CLITHERO: That was the issue. So the issue that we had is we -
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: - weren't able to confirm this as the deployment that Sergeant DAMERVILLE described.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: We followed on FED video to find other deployments, we didn't see any of these. You know, we came to the conclusion that this was most likely the one. Does that deployment look consistent with how OC vapor behaves?
DOBSON: Yeah, nothing happened.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: I mean, you - sorry, you wouldn't be able to necessarily see the vapor come out of it. It's a vapor -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - and so it's not like it's a heavy vapor like a mist or a cloud. We call it a cloud just because tryin' to describe what it is, but you wouldn't see it. And, you know, from just that little snippet that I saw, he rolls it into an area that, because of it's application, it only goes, like I said, about eight feet cloud-ish.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: And there was nobody in there, so, you know, it's not gonna - unless you walk through the cloud, you're not gonna have any effect on it.
CLITHERO: Okay. Okay. So, I'll give you some insight. So Sergeant POOL indicated in his interview that sometimes folks on scene will laugh when you deploy OC vapor 'cause they can't see anything happening, until they figure out that there's actually vapor coming out of it. So I say that to say, I heard you say that you wouldn't necessarily be able to see it.
DOBSON: You would not be able - in most cases you would not be able to see it.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Sorry. Part of this question is just to try, with as much certainty as possible, identify this as the deployment that Sergeant DAMERVILLE described in his report.
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: Okay.
BERRY: Can I interrupt for a minute?
CLITHERO: Yes.
BERRY: Do you have a sense of why an officer or sergeant might deploy OC vapor in an area where people aren't, like we saw there?
DOBSON: So, a hypothetical here.
BERRY: Absolutely.
DOBSON: It's like rollin' a bowling ball, and sort of lumpy bowling ball, but, you know, my assumption would be the target would've been that group that was in front of him that was kinda clumped up. But his throw, either through inertia or because of, you know, whatever, he overthrows it, and it goes past the group. Again, hypothetically, I don't know. I haven't asked him. I haven't talked to him about it.
BERRY: Yeah.
DOBSON: But, I mean, you know, any kind of hand-tossed, that's one of the challenges you have is, can I land it exactly in the right place? And sometimes you over-toss. Sometimes it takes a wrong spin, it gets bumped. And so that's the challenge with any of that, as opposed to say a 40 millimeter that, you know, you can aim at a specific person.
BERRY: Mm-hmm. Thank you, sorry to interrupt.

CLITHERO: Okay. Yeah, and just a follow-up question that I have, and this was a concern that came up as we reviewed video over the course of the summer. You know, tossing a munition like that, and this one obviously didn't land among people, but if the idea is to toss it at a target or into a crowd of people, can you talk a little bit about concern around this notion of like indiscriminate use of something like that?
DOBSON: In what way?
CLITHERO: I mean, I guess the working theory is that throwing that into a crowd might be considered indiscriminate use of like a vapor or a fog. I guess, can you clarify whether you think that's indiscriminate use of that munition or not, I guess is the clumsy question I'm getting' to.
DOBSON: So, again, without asking where he's aiming and what the purpose is behind it, you know, he very well could've been aiming for a group that he saw something that he was - you know, the concept behind an OC vapor is you're looking for a knot of people who are committing or about to commit, or part of that tumultuous activity that you're concerned life safety about, and that you're aiming for them to try to break them up.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: So yes, I some aspects, it's a limited - I lost the word here, in-discretionary tool, but it's limited to a small group. As opposed to CS, I mean, CS is far greater and indiscriminate, because it goes volumes.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: And so that would be a piece of that -
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: - consideration.
CLITHERO: Okay. Appreciate that clarification. Okay. From the ICS log, I can kind of glean that the objective was to clear the 7-Eleven parking lot. It says, "OC is authorized. No RBDDs." And the question - and it's similar to the ones I've asked as we reviewed prior videos, would you have ordered that specific deployment of OC vapor from your position at CMIC?
DOBSON: This is Redact I have authorized OC vapor -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - and RBDDs. So that's coming from your field commander.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Your lieutenant on the ground.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: And then he clarifies that RBDDs are only for the life-threatening piece. Would I have ordered that? No.
CLITHERO: Yeah, okay.
DOBSON: I mean, you can see -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - he's giving instruction there.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Or at least that's what's being recorded.
CLITHERO: Okay. That's the question. And I could do a whole interview on scribe logs in general, but as far as like tryin' to identify who's sayin' what, or what's being attributed to who, it's pretty difficult as looked over volumes and volumes of these things.
DOBSON: Sure.
CLITHERO: So I appreciate you -
DOBSON: City Attorneys had the same issue.
CLITHERO: Yeah. And we interviewed scribes, so we appreciate the -
DOBSON: Oh good.
CLITHERO: - complexity of actually trying to do all the shorthands.
DOBSON: In the moment.
CLITHERO: Yeah, as it's comin' at you. Okay. So we're moving on to the last three videos that we have. And

they'll be a little more in-depth. The first one's gonna be 06/02 of '20, which became known in media circles as Tear Gas Tuesday. And I have some questions ahead of the video first.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: So in a review of records, and just generally in your memory, does 06/02 of '20 stand out in your memory among the 180 nights as significant or memorable?
DOBSON: Yes.
CLITHERO: Okay. Can you tell me what you recall about it, generally?
DOBSON: I've given depositions on it. I've given declarations on it. If I recall correctly, that was the night that we had two separate groups in the downtown area, one that had organized at Pioneer Courthouse, and the other one was away from there, but we were dealing with them at our fence line.
CLITHERO: Okay. What was the purpose of the fenced exclusion zone?
DOBSON: So starting 05/29 was the event that occurred here, march from north all the way down into downtown. They broke into this building, set up the jail side, on fire on the records side. Between there and June - and I don't remember exactly the date. There's several days there where night shift - I worked night shift. Day shift has your, you know, how do I wanna say this, normal folks that worked during the daytime, your normal staff, the chiefs and politicians, and stuff. As I came in on one of those nights, I was briefed, hey, you know, we have decided that we wanna put out a fence to kind of protect some of this area. There was a discussion at this point in time of my concern of the size and breadth of which they had put fencing up. But again, it was kind of at the policy level that had made that decision, as opposed to, you know, at my level as in charge of the event. And we worked through that for a couple of nights, and this fell within those nights of we had this very large, I don't what to call it - I guess exclusion zone of your critical infrastructure down here. You had the two courthouses, city hall, federal, as well as city buildings, as well as the Justice Center that had been attacked. And on a tactical level, or operational level, I had concerns about how big it was based on the resources that I had available to me. But at the policy level, it was given to me that this is what you have, work with it, and make it work.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. You mentioned CMIC being on site at Central Precinct, there being a fire that kinda pushed you out to a different location. Did the fence have to do as well with that? Did that play into that?
DOBSON: No, it had to do with security.
CLITHERO: Gotcha.
DOBSON: Of moving the command post? Is that your question?
CLITHERO: Yeah.
DOBSON: Yeah, that was a security question more than anything.
CLITHERO: Okay. So from the ICS logs, and I'll ask a general question, I can pull them up if we need to reference, but it looks like there were two groups that were active on 06/02 of '20 - one that was peaceful at the square, and therefore really kinda not active, and a more aggressive group a few blocks away. Was that something that you saw commonly over the course of 180 days? Or was that something kinda confined to this night, or?
DOBSON: So in June, we had over 30 days of peaceful protest, typically in the day or afternoon time that would butt up against a second group that would show up later on that was causing more of the criminal activity. And so it was not uncommon, although very rarely was it reported, because if it didn't bleed, it didn't lead from the media side of the house, and so we often would have a peaceful event while we were dealing with an unpeaceful event.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: And to preface it, this was the start of kind of where we're at, 'cause I think we're only what, three days-
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - four days into this? And so if you step back and look at it, you've got multiple groups and communities involved, and they're still figuring out how this is working as well. You know, from my perspective, they're all figuring out, okay who's gonna play with which groups, and so eventually you start to see them clearly separate. But this is early on, and so this is on, and so this is one of those nights where everybody's kinda there, you got a peaceful group in Pioneer Courthouse Square, and then you got another group that's testing us at the fence.

CLITHERO: Okay. And so in terms of managing and marshalling your resources, what do you have to consider in managing those two very different dynamics there? You have the peaceful folks at the Square, and then the more active folks down a few blocks away. What do you have to consider in how you respond to the active group?
DOBSON: So, typically for the peaceful groups, we would assign dialogue police officers to try to communicate with them, get an idea of where they're at, they being our protest community. Where they're at, you know, what are they thinking? Where are they gonna go? That kind of thing. So we attach dialogue, and just have conversations with them. And really, resource wise, we don't apply any resources to them. They're peaceful. There's no reason to put resources on there.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: All the rest of the resources are focused, especially in this night, around our fence, to protect that I'd been given to say, "This is critical infrastructure, we need to keep this safe."
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Do you recall what crowd behavior among the active crowd precipitated the use of CS gas on that date?
DOBSON: So my recollection is that - and the logs I think have it as, again, it's a slow escalation. They're probing the fence, they're testing the fence. And the fence isn't fixed to anything, it's just simply fencing that they put basically building-to-building with the little feet on it, and it's just sitting there. There's no attachment, there's no security to it. And so it slowly builds that night, to the point where they're testing it. They're startin' to throw things over the top of it at our officers, and our role at that point in time is again, to protect the area within that zone. And it gets to a point where it's like, okay, we're taking enough rocks and bottles, somebody's gonna get hurt. It's time to disperse them. The challenge is is I have a fence between me and them, and so how do I do that while considering the peaceful group that's just a few blocks away, and how do I do it in a way that I'm not affecting them? Because we don't want to, one, they have a right to be there, we don't want to affect them negatively. And at the same time, negatively, we don't want them involved or become angry at us, because now we've affected them as well.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm. Do you have a question?
BERRY: Oh no, not at all.
CLITHERO: I'm sorry. Okay. I have a question I kinda left on the table and kinda saved for now, 'cause I think it has more context to it. Generally speaking, and for purpose of crowd control, what is CS gas designed to accomplish?
DOBSON: The goal is it's an irritant.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: So it's like, it's to clear an area.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Just to give you time and space to be able to have a safe area.
CLITHERO: Okay. And I heard you say earlier that typically like to give two warnings prior to a deployment, and that you announce what direction you'd like them to go. And CS gas has the requirement there is an available avenue of escape?
DOBSON: Correct.
CLITHERO: Okay. The direction that you gave from the sound trucks, and that you give prior to deployment, is that typically the avenue of escape that you want them to go to?
DOBSON: Typically, yes.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you.
DOBSON: That night was a little tricky, because you had another group there, and we didn't want to push them into that group or end up pushing ourselves into that group.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: And again, that's ideal. I think it's important to remember that there are certain circumstances where if it's evolving fast enough, we won't be able to get that warning out prior to that.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.

DOBSON: If it becomes untenable, life safety type thing.
CLITHERO: Okay. Do you recall if there were life safety issues at play on this evening that precipitated the use of gas?
DOBSON: I believe it go to the point where we were worried about officer safety because of the amount of volume of violence being directed at the officers.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. So before we jump into the video, I want to get into some content, just a couple of questions around some language that's in reports. I can pull it up if you want. I can read it aloud from my -
DOBSON: You can read it aloud.
CLITHERO: Okay. Okay, so on Pages 42 and 49 of the report from this evening, the quote is, "IC ordered us to move - IC, Incident Command, ordered us to move the crowd out of Pioneer Square." In another quote, "Operational Command gave us an order to push back the crowd west from this location."
DOBSON: Read that again.
CLITHERO: "Operational Command gave an order to push back the crowd west from this location." And the question I'm getting to, they use the word "push" a lot in the reports. Are you giving orders for them to actually physically push with their hands or push with their batons, or is "push" synonymous with move them out. Like, I'm just tryin' to kinda pin that down. Are you ever, from your CMIC location, giving them orders to push with their batons, push with their hands specifically?
DOBSON: No.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: We give a mission.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Again, a mission in the context of, okay, we need to clear this area. We need to, you know, clear this area or push, but it's not a, hey, I want you to physically go in there with your hands or batons and - I'm not gonna give that. I'm not gonna be that specific, because again, I'm not there.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: I have to trust that they are making solid decisions based on what they're seeing in front of them.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. It was just some of the rudimentary questions -
DOBSON: Sure.
CLITHERO: - that I warned us about early on.
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: On this night, you declared an unlawful assembly but did not declare a riot. Can you tell me what differentiates the two and what the distinction here was?
DOBSON: I think we talked about that earlier -
CLITHERO: Uh-huh.
DOBSON: - in that we did not use "riot" a lot. We used "unlawful assembly." ORS doesn't define either one super well. I mean, the level to have a riot is five or more people acting in tumultuous activity. There was not a single night that we didn't have five or more people acting in a tumultuous activity, yet the word "riot" has connotations attached to it. I don't want to say - perception wise, we're tryin' to control the perception of what's actually occurring so that we aren't, you know, exacerbating it. We're already dealing with multiple levels of Twitter wars between the federal government and our - later, not at this point in time, federal government and our own government on what's actually happening that are just adding to the complexity of how this is playing out. And so we use, again "unlawful assembly" almost synonymous with "riot," but carefully not use "riot," if that makes any sense at all.
CLITHERO: Okay, it does.
DOBSON: You know, almost every night on a Friday night, you could technically declare a riot down in the entertainment district based on the definition of ORS says is a riot.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: That's not gonna happen.

CLITHERO: Appreciate that. Thank you. In the last couple of videos we were able to kind of identify where. I mean, the last video you said you audibly could hear the commanding of a dynamic coming from the ground.
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: This is in a report, and it's Lieutenant SCHOENING. This is Officer KUYKENDOLL'S FDCR.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: But the highlighted portion is Lieutenant SCHOENING broadcasted to disperse the crowd to the east by using riot-control munitions and gas. So I wanna clarify the phrasing on that, 'cause it's an officer's perception. But, would the field commander give an order to disperse using CS gas specifically?
DOBSON: Yes.
CLITHERO: Okay. And so, is that at Lieutenant SCHOENING'S discretion at that time, or is that an order coming from the CMIC to disperse gas to move the crowd?
DOBSON: Typically, we are working with Field Command, having discussions back and forth, going through an array of, okay, is this the right tool? What are we trying to accomplish and how do we accomplish it in the best way.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Getting input from Field Command, hey, we're thinking about, you know, at this point, CS gas would probably be our best option. We would then say, "You're authorized to use CS gas."
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Ultimately, they on the ground have to make the decision of in the right time, in the right place, is it okay? And so by giving that direction, we can disperse with it. That's direction, but it's not olly olly oxen free, I'm ordering you to do it.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Each grenadier has to independently make the decision on where I'm at, is it the right tool? Is it appropriate, that makes sense? Because he's on the ground. He's got squads all over the place, and each one of those might have a different scenario that indicates that I don't have a - you know, if my group over here is just sitting on the sidewalk, I can't use gas. That just doesn't make sense.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: That would go against their rights, as well as our Directives. And so each individual grenadier and sergeant down there on the ground is making those decisions of, is it appropriate? Are we close to freeways? Are we close to homeless camps? Are we close to hospitals or convalescent homes? Is the wind direction the correct way? You know, if it blows the wrong way, how is it gonna affect things?
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: And so all of that is added into this decision-making that goes in. It's not just like, "You will," and they, without thought, go forth and just do it.
CLITHERO: Okay. So, potentially, is it possible that you have your discussion with Field Command, you authorize the use of gas. Is it possible that following that that CS gas doesn't get deployed based on a variety of factors at the discretion of the Field Commander?
DOBSON: Yes.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. I wanna jump into some of the video now. And this is one that we have a few videos for.
ROBBINS: And this is still June 2nd?
CLITHERO: This is still June 2nd.
(Video begins at 01:08:40.)
CLITHERO: And this one is gonna be prohibitively long. Again, I wanna be - I wanna be careful about moving through video and removing context. This is basically, to my eye, the start of the deployment of gas following the peaceful crowd having left and this remaining crowd just east of Pioneer Square.
(Video continues from 01:09:05 until 01:10:48.)
CLITHERO: I'm gonna stop there. Does that appear to be a PPB munition? Or does that look like something from

the crowd, or can you tell?
DOBSON: I wasn't paying attention to that.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Can you back up a little bit?
CLITHERO: I can.
DOBSON: And I'll see.
BERRY: Kinda top left, there you go.
(Video being playing at 01:10:59.)
DOBSON: It was likely PPB.
CLITHERO: Okay.
(Video stops playing at 01:12:02.)
CLITHERO: So we have more video to get through, and I have a timestamp up here to save us a few minutes that gets us to - there's the crowd to the east here -
DOBSON: Mm-hmm.
CLITHERO: - that is also addressed with gas, and I think that's where the concern and flag in the video begins.
(Video beings at 01:12:23 and ends at 01:13:38.)
CLITHERO: So that's the end of that video. I guess the question I have based on that one is really, is that, to your eye, how CS gas is designed to work?
DOBSON: In what way?
CLITHERO: I mean, I guess - I don't know how to rephrase the question. So you saw the grenadiers deploy the munitions in the proximity of the crowd. I guess, to your eye, is there anything out of place in the video? Anything that would cause you concern?
DOBSON: With the tear gas?
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: I guess I'm - where we -
BERRY: Well, we talked about it earlier, tear gas, and I think you told us usually is usually used to clear a crowd -
DOBSON: Sure.
BERRY: - out of a particular area. So, in this case, they deployed some gas from the north and then east. In terms of the deployment to the east, do you think it was effective in moving that crowd out of the area?
DOBSON: We saw enough of it to know whether it was effective or not. They can do it close up, or at times, knowing that, you know, there's a distance there already, they can use - we have tear gas that is able to be deployed at a distance.
CLITHERO: Okay.
BROWN: Under what circumstances would you deploy it at a distance? Like what's the parameters?
DOBSON: So hostility wise, rather than get right up on the crowd, one of the tactical advantages of tear gas is is you can deploy it at a distance so that you don't have to engage physically with the crowd, and you can disperse them from a distance, or keep that gap, if you will. And so, you know, in this case, you've got a crowd that you maybe don't wanna fight with, or you have indicators that it's gonna be too - you're gonna have an excessive amount of hand force to move them, that this might be the appropriate tool.
BROWN: Just a clarifying question, so then, "excessive amount of hand force," are you meaning quantity, not disproportionate to what would be required to remove or move a subject along?
DOBSON: Quantity. So for example, one of the concerns we had was as we moved later on into the year, as we lost or restricted certain tools, our ability to stand back and influence the crowd versus being right on them and having to use a baton, you know, where I might break a bone, increased. So tear gas, I can disperse a crowd, not injure anyone physically, not break bones. So it's what we consider the risk of damage to the individual is lower by using tear gas than if I had to physically push that crowd hand-to-hand with a baton, if that makes sense. Because I'm havin' to go, you know, fisticuff with them.
BROWN: So can I ask then, what would be the type of threat that officers might be facing that would cause the

need to use OC gas from that far away? That's kind of more of what I meant. When you have that distance between your crowd, what is the threat from the crowd -
DOBSON: Sure.
BROWN: - that you're responding to?
DOBSON: So I guess there's two things. If I know that I need to move that crowd, and I know I'm gonna fight with 'em or I've already fought with them, and I'm gonna have to fight with them again, if I know I can disperse them, start that dispersion with CS gas so that I don't have to use, again, the number or amount of force -
BROWN: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - I would do that. From that distance, they can easily launch things from us. We were -
BROWN: From us or at you?
DOBSON: Sorry, at us. There were times where when we were here at this building, they were launching things from three blocks away to hit us with, rocks, bottles, and other type of devices. The fireworks that they used would easily go that far to be able to hit us with, as well.
BROWN: So what you just talked about, fireworks, rocks, bottles -
DOBSON: Right.
BROWN: - coming from far away, are those the kinds of things that - I'm just tryin' to be clear on in what -
ROBBINS: Would it help you to look in the scribe notes from that night?
BROWN: - in what instance - and I don't -
DOBSON: Yeah.
BROWN: Yeah, I don't know that I need it. I just wanna understand generally, am I going down what you were going to say?
CLITHERO: No, you're into my bag of questions, but -
BROWN: Okay, I'll let you go.
CLITHERO: Well, you can answer her question. It's one of mine.
BROWN: But that video, I'm just tryin' to get more clarity on.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: I think I understand where you're comin' from of they're half a block, three-quarters of a block away. What threat are they to us?
BROWN: Yep.
DOBSON: So why are you doin' tear gas? I would say, from our framing is if I know I'm gonna be pushing that crowd, I'm gonna need to go engage the crowd, I have a couple of options. I can disperse them using tear gas to lessen the chance that I injure any of them or have officers injured.
BROWN: And I'm going to - yeah, what leads up to - I wanna go prior to that. Hang on, don't tell me.
DOBSON: Yeah.
ROBBINS: No, I'm gonna -
DOBSON: Yeah.
BROWN: Prior to the decision - I understand why you're using tear gas in that instance, as far as the choice for that tool versus hands-on.
DOBSON: Okay.
BROWN: I get that. Step back one step earlier, when you're that far away, what is going to lead you in the first place to make a decision that you need to disperse them, given have the distance between you and that crowd?
ROBBINS: Can I ask it in a different way?
BROWN: Yeah, 'cause I think you know what I'm tryin' to ask.
ROBBINS: I think what she's asking is, were there life safety concerns for officers at that time, and if there were, what were they when there's what appears to be a distance between the crowd and the officers?
BERRY: Gotcha.
DOBSON: Okay.
BROWN: Yeah, or what kinds of things. 'Cause you may not remember that particular night. What kinds of things

were those instances?
DOBSON: So in general, the challenge is, as you saw, there's four corners there, and basically four different crowds that we're dealing with. To get us to that point, we knew up to that point we'd had rocks and bottles. We'd had all kinds of devices thrown at us. And so the challenge is is I might've moved them previously. I don't know where we're at here, so I don't know what encounters we've had thus far with them that then they make the decision, hey, it might be safer to do tear gas before I engage them again, knowing that I just engaged them a few minutes ago and took rocks and bottles and we had fisticuffs. And so, that would be part of the calculus that they're using when they're out there going, I'm still trying to disperse this crowd. Does that make sense?
BROWN: Okay.
DOBSON: Leading up to this, and I don't know if this is one of the nights, the 29th, once they broke free of this building, they looted all over downtown. We had at least a couple of more nights of that. And again, I don't know if this one plays into that, 'cause I can't remember the notes. But that was - one of the concerns was, we've already seen it broke loose, and we've had it on a couple of nights where they've then started to break and not just focus on the police, but now they're breaking in general other things and looting other things. And so I'm sure that was part of a piece of that as well.
BROWN: 30 seconds.
DOBSON: Can I take a potty break?
ROBBINS: Yeah.
CLITHERO: Absolutely.
DOBSON: Can we take a break here?
ROBBINS: Yes, me too.
CLITHERO: Okay, we are going off the record at 11:33. It is 11:41, we're back on the record. Okay, HEIDI, we got through a few of my questions with yours, so that's good.
BROWN: Okay.
CLITHERO: Okay, I'm gonna show some video to kinda set up a question, to just get a kind of a sense of how things are going with the gas. This is going to be use of gas questions based on what we see visually, if my computer cooperates. And I'm just gonna have us watch snippets of these.
(Video begins at 01:22:35 and ends at 01:23:50.)
CLITHERO: Okay. I'm gonna jump out of this one, and I think you'll know why I'm moving through these quickly.
(Video begins at 01:23:58 and ends at 01:24:37.)
CLITHERO: So quick question here. So I can hear - and we can agree that the announcements are telling the crowd to move to the north. Can we stipulate that based on visually, that the way ahead here is to the north? I can see the AC Hotel there.
DOBSON: Okay.
CLITHERO: The gas is moving toward the north, so there's a cloud in the direction they're supposed to be going. My question is, is that generally how gas is designed to work, or would you have concerns for them moving further through more gas? This gets at the available avenue of escape. Do you think the folks moving through this cloud of gas feel like they have an available avenue of escape if they're running into more gas? Very layperson question.
DOBSON: Sure. Yes, we're giving the general direction of north. However, as you can see, there's multiple groups of individuals.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: I don't know how to answer your question here. There's folks that, from where I'm at, could go west from here, based on this little snippet of video that I'm looking at. Yes, generally we give a direction. At times, depending on wind, and especially downtown, the challenge with using CS gas is it can blow in different directions.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: So one block it blows one way, and because of, I think it's thermal dynamics is the word that they use, the next block it literally will blow the opposite direction. And so, I mean, it is one of the challenges of using gas.
CLITHERO: Okay. Is that somethin' you account for in training or debriefs?

DOBSON: We try to.
CLITHERO: Okay. Okay, it sounds like there's a certain amount of unpredictability -
DOBSON: With the buildings and the weather, yes.
CLITHERO: Okay. Yeah, I know there was - just anecdotally, there were quite a few complaints that we received over the course of the summer about, you know, the clarity of the direction that was being given to move a certain direction, or whether that would change, but also the dynamic of, you know, gas being in places they were being directed to go. That's what brought this to mind as I viewed it.
DOBSON: And what I see is initially, sometimes when we start that direction and give that direction, the crowd is largely grouped together. And then once the dispersion starts, they start to get scattered. And so, although our messaging is, "Go north," as it spreads out, it gets a little wider on which direction you could go.
CLITHERO: Okay. Appreciate that. Thank you. In the interest of time, I'm gonna move us along to another video here. Now this is a video capturing kind of the same dispersal from a crowd member perspective.
ROBBINS: So this is the same video?
BERRY: Yeah.
CLITHERO: This is -
BERRY: You need to rewind the video.
(Video begins at 01:27:45 and ends at 01:29:11.)
CLITHERO: There's nothing specific about this video. What I want to draw attention, just kind of the visual volume of gas. I don't wanna use the term "reasonable person," 'cause I don't want to get us into weird territory. To kind of the layperson and a concerned Portlander, right, in watching these videos, I guess I wanna advocate for the perspective of this visually appears to be a lot of gas. That's just a lot of the, you know, the feedback that was born out. I mean, I guess the question I'm getting to is, is this how, visually to you, is this typical behavior when you use gas? Of how the gas operates, how it kind of fills the area? I mean, is there anything unusual about this, or is this just kind of how gas works? How it operates?
DOBSON: It, again, largely depends on the weather pattern.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: And again, downtown, it operates different than other places. The concentration level, obviously it's gonna be at the folks that are on the ground deciding what's best. If there's lots of wind and it carries it quickly and disperses it quickly, you might need more. Again, I can't describe - and the challenge being, I don't know how much of that's gas, how much of it's smoke, how much of it is from fireworks, how much of it is from, you know, some of the other pyrotechnics that are being used. If we're in the thermal inversion layer, so if you know anything about thermal inversion, at some point, the temperature drops and things - you know, if you watch smoke this time of year, at a certain point of the night, the smoke that's coming out of your house then starts to drop down to the ground and will stay on the ground more.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: And so I don't know if we're at the thermal level where things are startin' to lay thicker down on the ground at this point in time.
CLITHERO: Okay. Okay, appreciate that. So I asked all that to get at - I don't wanna spend a ton of time on this. A lot of that perception was born out in a report that was released by a group called Forensic Architecture. I put that stuff on the thumb drive, but I know a lot of folks that we talked to over the course of our interviews had seen it and were familiar with it.
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: Is that a study that you were familiar with?
DOBSON: I read it.
CLITHERO: Okay. Had you read it prior to us providing it, or -
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: Okay. I have a set of questions on that report. Okay, so one of the theses of that report was that concentration of CS gas reached lethal levels, levels as established by OSHA and by the Geneva Convention, and

some other standards they addressed in the report. Do you have any thoughts on those conclusions, as far as the concentrations of CS being deadly, or, you know, detrimental long-term to people?
DOBSON: No.
CLITHERO: Okay. Are there any portions of PPB training that touch on like levels of gas concentrations, or is that a concern that's brought up as you folks train on using CS?
DOBSON: I haven't been through the training in a long time. When I went through the training, we did talk about it. There are two different types of - one is CS, one is CN. We no longer use CN because you can have lethal amounts of CN gas, 'cause of how it operates, and that kind of thing. But the course that I went through at that time said there was no lethal level of CS gas, especially in an open atmosphere.
CLITHERO: Okay. I may have you clarify that by just this next question I'm gonna ask is - it's been a long morning. Are you aware of any concentration of CS gas to have potentially deadly effects or long-term detriments to those subjected to it?
DOBSON: No.
CLITHERO: Are you aware of any resources or studies that dispel the claims that are counter to the Forensic Architecture studies? I guess, is there any information that I can get that would run counter to that, or I guess that's my question. Are you aware? Okay. I put it out there. Do you need clarification on it?
DOBSON: Sure.
CLITHERO: Okay. Forensic Architecture made this kind of allegation that there were lethal levels of CSUs on that date. Are you in a position to agree or disagree with that? And do you have any information that would run counter to that, or is there other materials I could look at that would clarify that?
DOBSON: Without understanding their methodology, I can't claim one way or another. I have concerns regarding the report and it's biases, based on the wording that they use in the first couple of paragraphs, of kind of the direction that they're going with it.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: I have had some of our analysts look at some of the methodology and they do question it, but I don't have any documentation that would refute it, other than, you know, I believe at one point they claimed through social media or information that they had gathered through the public that they came up with that we used X number of munitions, and of that number of munitions, the majority were X. And I mean, I don't know how you even verify that piece.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: So I have issues with their work.
CLITHERO: Okay. Yeah, you just answered my next three questions. On the basis of that report, did Portland Police Bureau review that internally? Make any changes or modifications to training or anything, like on the basis of that? Or otherwise react to it in any way?
DOBSON: We reviewed it. Again, the general feeling is that it's a biased report. Don't know if we can prove the methodology or the math of it. I know some of our analysts looked at it and had concerns as well as to how they came up with, you know, what they had. You know, they made a claim, I think at some point in it, that X number of pounds or kilos landed in the river. How do you know that they landed in the river and didn't keep going? I guess -
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: - there were lots of assumptions, I think that concerned me over the report.
CLITHERO: Okay, I appreciate that. We're away from information that's pertinent to the directive, so I think I'll move on from the study. Okay. We're gonna move on to 07/18 of '20. This is another dynamic.
ROBBINS: I'm sorry, what date?
DOBSON: 07/18.
CLITHERO: 07/18.
ROBBINS: 07/18.
CLITHERO: And I believe in your collection of emails, we identified this as a particularly active night, one of the

more active nights.
(Video starts and stops at 01:36:35.)
CLITHERO: There's a part I don't want to omit, because I don't think it would fair if I omitted it. So where this would start is - yeah, Detective KAMMERER pointed this out. I showed the video without benefit of the dumpster fire that's present at the beginning.
(Video begins at 01:36:53 and ends at 01:36:58.)
CLITHERO: So moving through, I wanna cut to where - so you've got - I'm gonna set this up a little bit with some context. When we reviewed this one, it looks like there's, you know, a crowd just kinda standing there, doesn't really seem to be any real aggression that's visible. I do think some bottles come out here.
(Video plays from 01:37:15 to 01:38:06.)
CLITHERO: I stop us only to point out, I know that it's a little dark, but you can kinda see shields among the crowd there.
(Video restarts at 01:38:11 and ends at 01:39:01.)
CLITHERO: Okay. So that was the use of force that was flagged there. And where the concern came from is that once the line starts to move, the crowd also starts to move, and the dynamic occurs into a crowd that appears to be moving. And so when we interviewed Detective KAMMERER, he discussed the dynamic of shield walls, and he was concerned about a shield wall forming. Can you talk a little bit about the tactic of crowds using shield walls and how that impacted kind of your ability to move them on the ground?
DOBSON: So there were several occasions roughly through August where we would see that they would bring shield walls, they used to defend themselves, to hide behind. Again, if we go back, we had information that they had been using, for lack of better words, Hong Kong tactics. They were aware of what had happened in 2015 in Hong Kong and had adopted many of those tactics, which is not uncommon. If you look across the history, in the Occupy movement, there were times because of social media now, you've got folks that learn - I remember in 2010 or '11 or '12 where they would talk about Greek tactics, where they used Greek tactics based on what they had seen previously in the week before that looked like it was effective for them to use. The idea of a shield wall, again, is it gives them kind of a point that they can help defend themselves so that they don't have to move and can continue to hold that position through that, or use them - as we come up, they can also use them to defend themselves or offensively hit us with those shields.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Much like, you know, if you look in Europe, the police use shields. We've chosen not to use shields, but they're a defensive tool, but you can use them offensively as well.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. So in terms of as far as having a crowd of folks in front of you that are static and some of whom have shields, is there a concern about allowing them to remain static for a certain amount of time? I'm tryin' to get at the purpose of running the dynamic in that scenario for folks that are standing there.
DOBSON: So without knowing, I mean again, I don't know what the context is here, why we're again pushing them or moving them. Starting a dynamic that far off, so that they have then - visually they can see that you're coming. Again, my thought, if I were to be the one making that decision would be, okay they see me coming at a trot. I need to now start to leave 'cause they're still coming.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: And so maybe it would be appropriate for me to pick up and move. Again, we talk about that continual contact that we have with them. So you saw the rocks and the bottles that you could see, and the projectiles. It looked like they were throwing some of the pyrotechnics back at us. And so again, part of the idea of getting them moving at a pace that they can't stop and turn and throw things at you would be part of, I believe their purpose of doing that.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. So similar question I've asked over the course of these other videos I've shown. Would you, as CMIC, have ordered this specific action?
DOBSON: Not this specific action.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you.

DOBSON: Sounds like at the beginning of it we had declared a riot, so I would've been the one that would've - you know, if I was the person over this night, I would've declared the riot -
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: - based on whatever occurred. And previously that declaration is based off of something that happened prior to what we're watching here that got us there. You know, by July, it was life safety type of events. So if we remember July in particular, fire is - you know, fire marshal at some point in July says, "No more fires. Temperature, humidity has dropped down. It's dangerous." Fast-forward to September 9th, and a good fifth of the state is on fire because of things. And so there were nights that based on the threat of fire, that things moved sometimes quicker than previous nights, because we had fire embedded with us. They're like, tonight we have a red flag warning night, or because of humidity or whatever the atmospheric conditions are, if a fire starts, particularly in North Portland, you're gonna lose neighborhoods of houses. Not just one or two. If it gets going because of the concentration of houses, you will lose entire neighborhoods, and we won't be able to stop it, so you can't let fire be a piece of the night. And so some of the decision - I can't say if this is a night that that occurred, but there were nights where we had to be more proactive at controlling some of that stuff.
CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Any questions about -
BERRY: No, none from me, thank you.
CLITHERO: Okay, thank you. We are winding down. So this is the last night of protests. This is 09/05 of '20.
DOBSON: Yes.
CLITHERO: Is that one that comes to mind for you over the course?
DOBSON: Oh yeah.
CLITHERO: Okay. And this is, for context, this is the night of the Molotov cocktail. And I had video of that. It doesn't appear I can -
DOBSON: Fair enough. I've watched it many times.
CLITHERO: Okay. Yeah, me too. I'm just gonna play some video, and then I have a set of questions associated with the video. And I'm gonna jump ahead in my timestamp. Announcements coming, so I'll make sure those are captured.
(Video plays from 01:45:20 to 01:45:59.)
CLITHERO: So quickly here, I mean, do you see any life safety concerns that are present on the video?
DOBSON: Yeah.
CLITHERO: Okay. Can you kinda talk me through those briefly?
DOBSON: So should we - sure, all those pyrotechnics can kill you.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: And not only on the mere basis of hurting your ears or permanently damaging your ears, if one of those lodged in your gear, it would kill you, and we've had our folks test that.
CLITHERO: Okay. So to clarify, what you're seeing, those are not Portland Police munitions being deployed?
DOBSON: Not the ones that are comin' this way.
CLITHERO: Okay.
DOBSON: Not coming towards us. Those are not Portland Police munitions.
CLITHERO: Okay, and they're certainly not behaving like Portland Police munitions. Okay. Gonna keep goin' here for just a little bit more.
(Video plays from 01:46:51 to 01:48:15.)
CLITHERO: Okay. So, again, the concern here is the visual amount of gas.
DOBSON: Yep.
CLITHERO: I think you addressed that earlier, so I'm gonna kind of move past that unless you have something to add based on what you're seeing here.
DOBSON: So, I think context matters here.
CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.
DOBSON: Prior to this, we had received their flyer. This is the 100th day. So we've had a hundred days of contact

up to this point in time. We knew behind the scenes that - we had seen their flyer that indicated that they were going to use fire. We're in September. This is literally before the entire state explodes because of the temperature, that it's about a week from here. We knew their target was the East Precinct, and that the intent was that they were gonna go try to light the precinct on fire using incendiary devices. And that's what even their flyer, you know, alluded to. There were code words that they used, of "Be water, but bring fire," I think is what the words were.

CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.

DOBSON: We set up. We knew that they were gonna gather in the park, or anticipated it. We set up, clearly where we had - we gave 'em some space and set up, but made it very clearly to them, soon as they stepped off the sidewalk, this isn't gonna happen tonight. You know, you're not goin' to the precinct. We're not gonna allow you to light things on fire tonight. Shortly thereafter is the Molotov cocktail that gets thrown at the police.

CLITHERO: Mm-hmm.

DOBSON: One, if not two. And they light one of their own folks on fire with that Molotov cocktail. This night in particular, and we had seen it growing, the level of fighting, and fighting back and forth, was fairly severe on this night, as well as previous nights leading up to this, based on some other things that were going on. So yes, it looks like it's a lot, but knowing that we had gone in and had - in last part of August, we had had some serious scuffles with these folks. Knowing that they'd thrown fire, and knowing that they had physically thrown Molotov cocktails at the police, or the police line at that point in time, we were not gonna take any chances of getting an officer hurt. And so, I didn't say, "Use heavy smoke." You know, I authorized the use of tear gas, knowing that we were in a neighborhood, which is, again, a problem because of - I don't control the gas, but I recognize that it now can expose neighbors. But the threat that we were facing, and the possible injury based on those Molotov cocktails, for me it was reasonable to authorize the use of tear gas to disperse that crowd.

CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. So, there were media reports over the course of the summer, 09/05 being once of those events, where there were folks who complained of ingesting CS in their lungs. I think you addressed that. Is that a consideration in the field, when considering the deployment of CS? With that question in mind, is there anything you want to add to what you just said?

DOBSON: I don't think so.

CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. How do you typically mitigate that concern in the face of needing to authorize the use of gas?

DOBSON: In what way?

CLITHERO: The general concern that folks would be concerned that gas would enter their homes. How do you account for that when you're makin' a decision to authorize gas?

DOBSON: Again, it's weighing the totality of what is reasonable. What is objectively reasonable? Can I articulate that I might be affecting other people based on the threat that I see at the moment? And unfortunately, on that night in particular, with the introduction of Molotov cocktails to us - and you saw the fireworks. Those are large mortar-type fireworks that we have taken and studied, and they will kill you because of just the over-pressure of themselves if they get too close to you. That's not a risk I'm willing to put my folks out there in and not give them some tool to be able to help push some of those folks out.

CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Very direct, again, a rudimentary question. In declaring a riot authorizing CS gas on 09/05, do you feel as though you met the TRO requirement for concern for life safety?

DOBSON: Absolutely.

CLITHERO: Okay. Thank you. Okay, a question I skipped over for 06/02. Did you feel as though your authorization of CS gas for use on 06/02 was within policy?

DOBSON: At the time, yes.

CLITHERO: Okay. Does anybody have any questions?

BERRY: I got nothin'.

CLITHERO: Anything I left out that anybody could drive a bus through?

ROBBINS: I have some follow-up.

CLITHERO: Okay.
BERRY: We typically have the Involved Member respond directly to the allegation, and then open the floor for follow-up questions. You wanna just get a response on board to the allegation, and then -
CLITHERO: Sure.
DOBSON: Sure.
BERRY: - we can do all the cleanup we want.
CLITHERO: Let me find it as it's written. Okay, so Allegation Number 1, the sole allegation. Commander CRAIG DOBSON inappropriately directed or authorized PPB officers to use force, in violation of Directive 1010, by extension, Directive 315, laws, rules, orders, and 635.10, crowd management, crowd control.
BERRY: And Directive 1010.
CLITHERO: And Directive 1010, use of force.
BERRY: Hearing the allegation against you, how would you respond?
CLITHERO: Sorry.
DOBSON: Not true.
BERRY: All right, excellent.
CLITHERO: Okay.
BERRY: Okay, let's open the floor. Ms. ROBBINS?
ROBBINS: Okay, just some follow-up. So you were asked just in that last video that was shown from September 5th that one of the concerns was the visual amount of gas. Would you agree that part of that could be smoke, which would've then contributed to people in the crowd throwing projectiles at the officers?
DOBSON: Yes.
ROBBINS: And that it's impossible to determine what smoke and/or gas is coming from what group?
DOBSON: At times, yes.
ROBBINS: Okay.
BROWN: Can you try to ask a little more question and a little less - thank you.
ROBBINS: So there was a question asked about shield walls, that apparently Detective KAMMERER brought up with respect to July 18th incidents. And then you mentioned the Hong Kong tactics. In addition to what you talked about with the shield wall, are those used to provide cover to individuals in the crowd?
DOBSON: There's a variety of reasons they would use 'em, but that is one of the reasons that they would.
ROBBINS: And what does cover allow? What is the purpose of that, to your knowledge?
DOBSON: It gives them, again, a position that they can use to throw projectiles, direct command and control, if need be. Like I said, it's a variety of things. Defend if, it that's some - for whatever reason they feel that they need to defend from that position.
ROBBINS: And then in one of the videos, I believe it was the community video from June 2nd, I noticed some black umbrellas in the crowd. Could you explain your training and/or experience with the significance of the black umbrellas?
DOBSON: Umbrellas were a popular thing in the Hong Kong demonstrations and were adopted here and other places throughout the world, where they would use them either as concealment to hide illegal or illicit actions, such as breaking windows or, you know, changing clothes to change their identity, to again, obscuring the ability for us to be able to use a less lethal tool on them, or even to deflect devices or tools that we're using or munitions we're using on them.
ROBBINS: So would it be akin to a shield, just a different material?
DOBSON: Yes, but it's not as effective. As I said, a shield can be used in an offensive manner. So if you go toe-to-toe, you can use the edges of a shield to hit or strike with, as opposed to umbrella, you've got the little pointy end, but the cloth doesn't give you much to whack people with.
ROBBINS: Okay. You mentioned several times kind of the phrase "life safety issues," and I believe this was brought up.
DOBSON: Yes.

ROBBINS: Could you just describe what constitutes life safety issues that you take into consideration?
DOBSON: So when we're looking at life safety, and I think I've talked a couple of times about it, one is crowd or officer safety. Is there actions going on that could injure someone severely? And I can use ORS, you know, what is it considered, you know, severe? You know, are you losing a limb? Are you gonna lose impairment, permanent impairment of things. There's the concern, as we talked about in North Portland in particular, the fire concern of it spreading. We dealt with hundreds of fires throughout that where they would roll it up to a building and set it on fire. They actually set multiple buildings on fire during that period of time. There were times that they set buildings on fire that were occupied with people. That would be a life safety thing. Mayor WHEELER'S condo over in North Portland, they set the dentistry office underneath his building on fire one night. All of those. Or a car, there were nights that a car or a vehicle would be involved, driving aggressively that was brought in to being part of that consideration of life safety. And so it's all about, am I gonna maim or injure someone or cause death of someone if I allow those things to go? Those fireworks, although portrayed in the public through the media as fireworks like your little sparklers, literally, the over-pressure of those, in talking to our bomb disposal folks is, could lead to death if it hit you in the right place and ignited or - what's the word? Exploded.
KOPPANG: Detonated?
BERRY: Yeah.
DOBSON: Exploded. Detonated at the right time, it literally could kill you, or, you know, seriously injure you. And so all of those are considerations when we're thinking about life safety and what does that look like.
ROBBINS: And in that same vein, what about water bottles? 'Cause we hear a lot about water bottles, and I think the lay perception of a water bottle is that that's a plastic -
DOBSON: Sure.
ROBBINS: - object being thrown. Is that a life safety issue?
DOBSON: It can be. We have had people hit with just a water bottle, not a frozen water bottle, but just a water bottle. The helmets that we have are not designed for concussion, they're designed for ballistics. We have since tried to modify our helmets with that. But we have had officers hit with just a water bottle and given 'em a serious concussion that has caused them to lose significant amounts of work because of that. And so, the number of water bottles, the type of water bottles, ball bearings being shot out of a wrist rocket that would be of the same magnitude of say shooting a .22 rifle at someone if you didn't have body armor on, it could penetrate you. All of those type of things could be significant enough to become a life safety issue.
ROBBINS: Okay. And then last, you, I think, touched on this several times, but just so we're clear. When you would authorize a specific tool in these scenarios, so on different nights if you authorized gas or you authorized the RBDD, is that an order by you for the line officer to actually use it, or could you explain the difference between authorization and order, if there is one?
DOBSON: Sure. How we operate is when I authorize, it gives them the access to use that tool if they feel it appropriate. And so there were times where because of the situation, we would authorize CS gas. And from the ground, based on what they saw, they chose not to use it. Because again, we talked about proximity of where it is. Later on, say in August, gas was off the table at times because of the location of it, because it might set grass on fire, and that type of thing. And so all of those considerations, we wanna make it available, but we don't tell them, this is what you must use, or you will use. It's, you have the ability to use it if it's an appropriate device based on the totality of the circumstances.
ROBBINS: I don't have anything else.
BERRY: All right. KOPPANG, do you have anything while we're rollin'?
KOPPANG: I'm all right.
BERRY: I think we're done with the Involved Interview.
KOPPANG: Okay.
BERRY: Time is approximately 12:19. Stoppin' the recording.